This article looks at the strong links between Deleuze's molecular ontology and the fields of complexity and emergence, and argues that Deleuze's work implies a 'philosophy of technology' that is both open and dynamic. Following Simondon and von Uexküll, Deleuze suggests that technical objects are ontologically unstable, and are produced by processes of individuation and self-organization in complex relations with their environment. For Deleuze design is not imposed from without, but emerges from within matter. The fundamental departure for Deleuze, on the basis of such an ontology, is to conceive of modes of relating to the evolution of technology. In this way Deleuze, along with Guattari, provides the basis for an ethics and a politics of becoming and emergent control that constitutes an alternative to the hubris of contemporary reductionist accounts of new areas such as nanotechnology.
scientists make, and are making, into the material world within the broadly defined field of nanotechnology. Indeed, it is at this level of specificity that the notion of endurance comes into its own. For nanotechnology, which is both scientific and technical (if we must bring up that old distinction), is concerned with making things. That is, nanotechnology is defined by the construction, generation and growth of objects, devices and architecture -all of which have a certain (provisional) endurance. In working at the nanoscale (10 9 m), in the world of Brownian motion and atomic uncertainty, this kind of endurance is produced by certain forms of control -specifically the control of sub-molecular particles, of biological systems, chemical syntheses, reactions and crystal growth. If it is possible to construct a nanostructure from a few atoms or molecules, or to grow one using a protein or some process of crystallization, the endurance of this structure is dependent on being able to control atomic-level forces that would tear it apart. Such endurance is premised on perpetual control.
Of course Deleuze was also famously interested in control, particularly in his 'Postscript for Control Societies'. For Deleuze, 'control' defines the political constitution of the contemporary moment. Critical of Foucault's analysis of modern discipline, he suggests that institutions and technologies of incarceration and discipline are being replaced by the mechanisms of control. He states: 'We're in the midst of a general breakdown of all sites of confinement -prisons, hospitals, factories, schools, the family (. . .) Control societies are taking over from disciplinary societies'. For Deleuze, this regime of control is not defined by any specific mechanism, technology or institution. Indeed, he states:
It's not a question of amazing pharmaceutical products, nuclear technology, and genetic engineering, even though these will play their part in the process. It's not a question of asking whether the old or new system is harsher or more bearable, because there's a conflict in each between the ways they free and enslave us. With the breakdown of the hospital as a site of confinement, for instance, community psychiatry, day hospitals, and home care initially presented new freedoms, while at the same time contributing to mechanisms of control as rigorous as the harshest confinement. 2 This then is one side of control: the side of power and determinism. This is the power of total control and it is the dream of many nanotechnologists. This is the kind of control through which some suggest that it will be possible to 'build anything we want' simply by arranging atoms the way we would like them. 3 However, for Deleuze, control is never absolute in this sense. Control is a product of a repetition of force. Therefore in the application of force and control we also see the radical possibility for creativity and escape. As such Deleuze is more interested in modes of control and modes of perpetuating coherence than in absolute control per se.
Deleuze's 'philosophy of technology' is both open and dynamic. He adopts an open stance in relation to science and technology. For Deleuze, the link between 'basic' scientific knowledge and technical systems -which is mediated through the disciplines of engineering, design, predictability and control -is neither simple nor necessary. For example, Deleuze's critique of the hylomorphic schema suggests instead that control and predictability emerge almost spontaneously. As such, and following Simondon and von Uexküll, technical objects for Deleuze are ontologically unstable, produced through processes of individuation and self-organization in complex relations with particular milieus. 4 What is significant here is not the scientism of Deleuze's own thought, but rather the stance that Deleuzian thought enables one to take in relation to the emergence of technical objects and systems. Recent scholarship on the use of scientific concepts in Deleuzian thought has tended to be polarized between realist and metaphorical interpretations: approaches that defend his use of mathematics and physics as either scientifically valid or allegorically salient. 5 Both of these positions interpret the use of science by Deleuze in solely conceptual terms -as if what is at stake is either the metaphysical rigour of his use of science or its metaphorical resonance. However, this choice between realism and idealism is a false one. Both (mis)understand science itself in wholly conceptual terms without any sense of the interconnected material practices and interventions fundamentally intertwined with the emergence of technical objects and systems. 6 Deleuze's use of science is much more political than philosophical, and much more attuned to the mechanisms of invention and creation to be simply cast as conceptual intellectual folly.
What is at stake in Deleuze is not Science, or even Philosophy. This is particularly the case in Deleuze and Guattari's almost 'disrespectful' treatment of the pillars of Science, Art and Philosophy in What is Philosophy?, where they state:
The three disciplines (art, science and philosophy) advance by crises or shocks in different ways and in each case it is their succession that makes it possible to speak of 'progress'. It is as if the struggle against chaos does not take place without an affinity with the enemy, because another struggle develops and takes on more importance -the struggle against opinion, which claims to protect us from chaos itself. 7 Deleuze and Guattari's interpretation of science is fundamentally materialist. The 'affinity with the enemy' is the same relation that the artisan makes with the wood, or the blacksmith makes with the metal outlined in A Thousand Plateaus. 8 In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari refuse the Cartesian definition of Science as simply conceptual invention. Rather, for Deleuze conceptual science is one expression of this material 'affinity with the enemy', in the same lineage as alchemy, woodwork and blacksmithery. To this end, in what follows I will outline Deleuze's stance in relation to invention, creation and technology. I will suggest that, in place of the reductionism of 'total' control, Deleuze's ethic aims to vitalize technology. Deleuze aims to open up and potentialize science and technology to the internal evolution of matter 'all the way down'.
Nanotechnologies
The prefix nano, from the Greek nanos meaning small, gives an immediate indication of the kinds of interventions in the material word envisioned by this word -small ones. A nanometre being 10 9 m, nanotechnology is technology on the atomic and submolecular scale. Nanotechnology encompasses work of advanced nanoscale science, particularly the increased understandings of atomicscale interactions and the capacity to visualize (or more correctly to characterize) and control materials at sub-micron levels using the scanning tunnelling microscope. However, as suggested by the suffix -technology -nanotechnology is also a term that designates new forms of practice at nano-metre scale.
The canonical story of the origin of nanotechnology is familiar and oft told. The Nobel Prize winning physicist Richard Feynman's now famous lecture, 'There is Plenty of Room at the Bottom' is commonly regarded as the first public musings by a scientist about the possibilities of technology on the nano-scale. 9 His notion that there is no physical barrier to the extreme miniaturization of technology operates as a central motivating discourse around which nanotechnology operates. Indeed in subsequent controversies around what counts as 'fact' and 'fancy' proponents have often claimed that they are simply expressing the implications of Feynman's original vision. One example is Eric Drexler's now (in)famous nanotechnology manifesto, Engines of Creation: The Coming Age of Nanotechnology, in which he outlines a Feynmanian notion of the sheer physical possibility of molecular nanotechnology as an alternative to modern 'bulk technology':
Coal and diamonds, sand and computer chips, cancer and healthy tissue: throughout history, variations in the arrangement of atoms have distinguished the cheap from the cherished, the diseased from the healthy. Arranged one way, atoms make up soil, air, and water; arranged another, they make up ripe strawberries. Arranged one way, they make up homes and fresh air; arranged another, they make up ash and smoke. 10 For Drexler, nanotechnology represents a mode through which life may be understood physically. Drexler's manifesto mirrors Feynman's vision: that there is no physical barrier or practical reason why current technology -medicine, information technology and engineering -cannot operate with precision at the nano-scale.
Nanotechnology is fundamentally technological. Its main objectives are forms of technique, process, and precision. Drexler's manifesto, which self-consciously mirrors science fiction in developing possible future nanotechnology scenarios, does not break new ground in terms of scientific knowledge regarding the atom. Rather it is a preparatory exploration, outlining the possible implications of the convergence of abstract atomic knowledge with increased technical ability at these scales.
Nanotechnology and 'reductionist returns'
The reductionism implicit in contemporary genetic technologies 11 is both extended and intensified in Drexler's account of nanotechnology. 12 For Drexler all things, both organic and inorganic, are simply a collection of atoms and molecules. In this sense Drexler's determinism is fundamentally physicalist. Whereas for genetic determinism it is assumed that life forms are determined by the process of heredity, for Drexler life itself is determined simply by its physical constitution. In this sense, life is absolutely divisible, and therefore manipulable. The only difference between material objects is the alternative arrangements that atoms take. Indeed, the radical possibility that Drexler presents is that, when control over the structure of matter is achieved, it will be possible to make 'almost anything' from the 'bottom-up'. 13 The root of this physicalist determinism is Schrödinger's essay What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell. In this essay Schrödinger outlines a physicalist understanding of life and matter upon which the dreams of an unlimited material abundance, produced by nanotechnology, are based. Indeed he initiates a 'materialist turn' in biology by suggesting that biological processes may be explained physically. Schrödinger asks: 'How can events in space and time which take place within the spatial boundary of a living organism be accounted for by physics and chemistry?' To which he gave the following answer: 'The most essential part of a living cell -the chromosome fibre -may suitably be called an aperiodic crystal.' 14 Schrödinger signals the fundamental idea that living cells are physical -that they are composed of physical elements, atoms and aperiodic crystals -and as such can be conceptualized in physics and chemistry as well as biology. The notion, articulated by proponents of nanotechnology, that such technologies may be able to cure diseases, remedy pollution and create clean energy, relies on this most basic premise of the atomic physicality of 'life'. Therefore Schrödinger's physicalism is paradoxical in that it also heralds a reductionist notion of the absolute divisibility of all life. In this sense the physical itself becomes nothing less than an instrumental concern in the technologization of life and nature. 15 There is a rich double meaning to Schrödinger's essay What is Life? His notion of matter and of life is irreducibly vitalistic. He is interested in life -in the physics of life. In one sense this life is about the physicality of life, its material and atomic bases, yet in another it is about a certain physical life or liveliness of matter. Schrödinger introduces a notion of the vital life of the atomic. He captures the movement, variation and digression of the material at atomic and molecular scales. Crandall embraces Schrödinger's move in his vision of nanotechnology: 'This bumbling, stumbling dance allows molecules all possible ''mating configurations'' with the other molecules in their local environment. By variously constraining and controlling the chaos of such wild interactions, biological systems generate the event we call life.' 16 For Crandall the promise of nanotechnology is of a technology of 'molecular construction', the miniaturization of macro-scale manufacturing techniques enabling the precise placement construction of objects atom by atom. Similarly, Drexler's vision is of nano-scale replicators -autonomous, self-replicating machines will enable such techniques of atomic precision to be infinitely multiplied. Building upon enhancements in the characterization of atomic structures and the precision with which these structures may be controlled, Crandall positions nanotechnology as the ability to create nano-scale machines and to construct material objects from the bottom up, through the precise alignment of sub-molecular materials.
For both Crandall and Drexler the simple fact that biological life is accomplished through the selective control over the movement of atoms and molecules demonstrates the possibility of similar humandesigned processes. Their ontology of the atomic, though emphasizing the internal movement, variation and flux, operates only as the technical limit upon what is possible. For Drexler and Crandall, the technical limits of nanotechnology are 'set' by the nature and being of atomic scale matter (its ontological status). At the core of the Drexlerian vision, as expressed by Crandall, is a notion of control. If the 'event we call life' is generated by the 'wild interactions' of particles at the nanoscale, the broad goal of fundamental nanoscale research must be toward achieving control over these interactions so that they may be directed in desired ways. As such, the Drexlerian vision of the possibilities for self-replicating nano-scale robots has become a programmatic definition of nanotechnology as the 'total (or near total) control over the structure of matter'. 17 The mechanistic reductionism of nanotechnology also has its roots in a logic of what might be properly termed a 'biological turn' in theoretical physics and mathematics. This 'biological turn' may be identified in the move toward the mathematical modelling of complex and naturally occurring phenomena -particularly in swarm and game theory. Of particular significance in the development of nanoscience and nanotechnology is von Neumann's mathematical modelling of self-reproducing systems. Von Neumann's theory of automata -modelled on the functionality of the neuron -is an expression of the sheer algorithmic possibility of computationally recreating naturally occurring self-reproducing systems. His is a vision of what is 'logically possible': 'A new, essentially logical, theory is called for in order to understand high-complication automata and in particular the central nervous system.' 18 As such, von Neumann's thesis suggests that naturally occurring self-replicating systems may be modelled mathematically. For von Neumann, the key to the mathematical recreation of cellular automata is the inherent logic embedded within the very complexity of such systems -what he terms 'complication'. At a high degree of complication -or complexity -systems are able to self-organize themselves. The key therefore is to discover the mathematical logic and laws through which systems of such high complexity operate:
All these are very crude steps in the direction of a systematic theory of automata. They represent, in addition, only one particular direction. This is, as I indicated before, the direction towards forming a rigorous concept of what constitutes 'complication' (or complexity). They illustrate that 'complication' on its lower levels is probably degenerative, that is, that every automaton that can produce other automata will only be able to produce less complicated ones. There is however a certain minimum level where this degenerative characteristic ceases to be universal. At this point automata which can reproduce themselves, or even construct higher entities, become possible. 19 For von Neumann, 'self-reproduction, evolution -life in brief -can be achieved within a cellular automaton -a toy world governed by simple discrete rules not unlike those of a solitaire game'. 20 Von Neumann's search was for the laws that governed the formation and functioning of cellular automata. His logical route is from the big to the small, from the complexity of self-organization to simple, discrete laws. Von Neumann offers a bio-mimetic logic where existing biological systems may be modelled through such laws and the precise control of the parameters of such systems. As such, von Neumann's notion of the algorithmic recreation of complex systems masks an extreme reductionism in which simple laws control complex systems. 21 The importance of Von Neumann's work in nanoscience and nanotechnology is two-fold. Firstly, his basic thesis that self-replicating automata are logically possible casts matter and the material as simple instrumental concerns. For von Neumann -and also for Drexler -if self-replicating automata are logically possible they must also, by necessity, be physically possible. Secondly, the combined effect of Schrödinger's physical understanding of life and von Neumann's logic of the self-replicating automata is to suggest that chemical and biological processes may be understood functionally as code or information. Von Neumann suggests that naturally occurring automata conform to algorithmic logic and that they may be technically recreated by manipulating the parameters of algorithms. This reductionism offers the possibility of total control of such biological and chemical systems. In this way biological systems become a set of mathematical and computational instructions that may be technologically re-ordered. Lehn echoes this understanding of biological and chemical processes by suggesting that forms of 'living' or 'complex' matter may be created by controlling the informational exchange at the heart of chemistry and biology. In what he terms 'supramolecular' chemistry, he suggests: Supramolecular chemistry has paved the way toward apprehending chemistry as an information science through the implementation of the concept of molecular information with the aim of gaining progressive control over the spatial (structural) and temporal (dynamic) features of matter and over its complexification through self-organisation, the drive to life. 22 Both the 'materialist turn' in biology and the 'biological turn' in mathematics and physics are concerned with a set of logical possibilities. Schrödinger's conception of the physics of life and von Neumann's mathematical theory of automata have the effect of converting life itself into discrete physical entities which operate as a form of information or code. This double move has the paradoxical effect of rendering the physicality of biological and chemical systems as merely instrumental concerns in the hylomorphic application of computational models onto material substrates. Combined with Feynman's vision of atomic-scale machinery, nanotechnology operates as a set of theoretical promises and possibilities for gaining 'progressive control' over the structure of matter in the design and manufacture of nanotechnologies. Life itself is cast as absolutely divisible. The mechanisms of reproduction and self-organization are themselves recreatable, given the precise control over the parameters of chemical synthesis of biological systems.
This rhetorical move from the big to the small, from the complex to the simple, and from the chaotic to the organized, parallels the overall imagination of nanotechnology as the ability to precisely control the ultimate building blocks of life. This logic is also comparable to the reductionism at the heart of some versions of complexity theory. Broadly speaking, whereas chaos theory works in the reverse direction -small events producing large results -complexity theory suggests that simple structures emerge and self-organize in the context of complex and dynamic systems. 23 Although the spontaneous emergence of organized structures is inherent to theoretical accounts of complexity theory, its technological operationalization often reveals a reductionist drive toward simplification and predictive control. 24 It is in the construction of complexity theory as a unifying project, through which total systems understanding, simplification and predictive control may be achieved, that complexity theory is at its most reductionist. For example, Capra defines complexity theory as: 'A new mathematical language and a new set of concepts for describing and modelling complex nonlinear systems. Complexity theory now offers the exciting possibility of developing a unified view of life by integrating life's biological, cognitive and social dimensions' (emphasis added). 25 By unifying biological, chemical and physical knowledge, complexity theory is thought to enable an enhanced capacity to model non-linear systems. By extension, complexity theory is seen to enable the precise control and recreation of such systems. 26 The rhetorical move from the complex, the large, and the extensive to the simple, the small and the intensive is ambiguously reductionist. Given this ambiguity, complexity theory masks a 'reductionist return' 27 in contemporary technoscience that is revealed in the currency of notions such as predictive control, modelling, law and total systems knowledge.
This reductionism mirrors the rhetorical efforts of miniaturization and simplification made by Feynman, Schrödinger and von Neumann. The combined effect of Feynman, Schrödinger and von Neumann is to cast biological, chemical and material 'life' as absolutely physically divisible and created through mechanisms that are ultimately controllable. Indeed, nanotechnology operates as a 'unifying' project similar to that of complexity theory -combining the traditional scientific disciplines of physics, chemistry, mathematics and biology with the technically-oriented disciplines of engineering and computing. Rhetorically, nanotechnology also relies upon a similar rhetorical move from the big to the small as the ultimate technical expression of the miniaturization imperative. Thus for Drexler, following Feynman, Schrödinger and von Neumann, the sheer logical possibility of nanoscale engineering and manufacture establishes the absolute reducibility of all forms of life and materiality to the atom and the technical possibilities for building things 'atom by atom'.
Unity versus singularity
The reductionism of advanced nanotechnology is also deeply political. The vision of nanotechnology as heralding the ability to remake the world 'atom by atom', and as leading to the 'next industrial revolution', is also a State-sanctioned vision of the power of science to revolutionize material practice. 28 The reductionism of nanotechnology, which demands total control of the atomic scale, is deeply entwined with this politics. This is what Deleuze calls the politics of the State, or the 'apparatus of capture', in which the unifying project of reductionist science works toward the total control demanded by the State.
Deleuze's ontology is of an entirely different order. Deleuze neither moves from the complex to the simple, nor from the simple to the chaotic. Rather he starts with the singular or -more properly -the singularity. Whilst in nanotechnology the unity represents the absolute divisibility of life, Deleuze starts with the notion of the singularity as the basis for molecular variation and flux. His 'philosophy of difference' is concerned with revalorizing the singular, over and above the particular. Consequently, he deploys an explicitly monistic ontology -a material pantheism whereby the singularity of matter is alive with the creative potential of endless evolutions and innovations. Deleuze states:
There has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal. (. . .) There are not two 'paths', as Parmenides' poem suggests, but a single 'voice' of Being which includes all its modes, including the most diverse, the most varied, the most differenciated. Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself. 29 What Deleuze does here is to free 'the singular' from 'the particular', giving it an individuating capacity. His notion of singularity is at once an absolute rebuttal of both the Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics of matter and a valorization of the creative vitalism of the material. He refuses the categorical difference, established by the metaphysicians, between matter and form or between the subject and the object. Rather, all things are formed through repetitious individuation of the same substance -the monadic singularity -intensities, riffs, sublimations in a singular key. Rethinking monadology in explicitly materialistic terms enables Deleuze to insist upon a materialism that is 'roughly equivalent to an ongoing Big Bang, permanent Creation', 30 precisely because whilst this evolution is both permanent and multiple, the substance upon which these operations are performed is singular. Thus it is not simply that 'matter is singular' as a universal substance. Rather, matters are singularities, momentary agglomerations in the creative evolution of the singular, monistic substance.
As a consequence of his emphasis on a monistic creative evolution, Deleuze's materialism is inherently spontaneous. For Deleuze, monism is not a form of reductionism to the atomic, the whole, the plane, or the easy to handle. Rather, in Deleuze's hands monism results in the elevation of the singular, the singular that is difference itself. Deleuze's philosophy of difference is singular precisely because it positions difference as internal to the object, rather than between (categorically different) things. In this way, he follows Simondon's drive to free individuation from any organizing principle of the individual. 31 Deleuze's aim is to compose a philosophy of difference -rather than of diversity -in the singular, where what differs is not one thing from another, but the thing from itself. This repetition of the singular, what Deleuze calls the production of singularities, imbues objects, things, substances and bodies with a dynamic sense of action. For Deleuze this spontaneity goes 'all the way down' and is not computable by law or assumptions of predictability. It is by following Simondon that Deleuze enables a dynamic theory of technology that resonates with the technical possibilities of nanoscience, in which the singular, the atomic and the molecular are energized in the creative production of difference. Repetition, for Deleuze, is the essence of creativity or -in Bergson's terminology -creative evolution. It is this monistic ontology of singularity (rather than unity) that imbues matter with a sense of unstable movement because the repetition of this monistic substance is not simply a matter of the production of equivalences. Rather, repetition is the production of difference, the movement and creative evolution of the thing: 'Repetition is a condition of action before it is a concept of reflection. We produce something new only on condition that we repeat -once in the mode which constitutes the past, and once more in the present of metamorphosis.' 32 Though Deleuze does not have what might be termed a 'philosophy of technology' -in the manner of Heidegger or even Derrida -one would imagine a Deleuzian stance or ethic toward technology that, following Simondon and von Uexküll, allows for the creative individuation of technology. Deleuze's stance toward technology is fundamentally a political engagement with powers of invention and creation. His basic concern is to free individuation, and the singularity, from the unifying project of 'total control'. Whereas in nanotechnology -as in other contemporary technologies -it is imagined that internal deviance, evolution and spontaneous self-organization may either be mastered or technically harnessed, Deleuze imagines a technology that is radically open to evolution 'all the way down'. Indeed, the problem for Deleuze with philosophies of technology (either the sceptical, Heideggerian versions of technology as threat, 33 or the more positive endorsements of the social-evolutionists 34 ) is that they treat technology as a distinct ontological category. Deleuze's philosophy is more an attitude or stance toward technologies that is open to the internal flux of technology, down to the molecular level.
This stance toward technology imbues Deleuze's attitude toward the 'total control' imagined in control societies. For Deleuze, control is not symptomatic, but rather emblematic. It does not emanate from a particular technology, or the 'technologization' of all forms of life itself, but is rather a kind of contemporary epistemic moment. The kind of control that Deleuze speaks of is the perpetual control of noise, variation and flux -the same modes of control over the internal differentiation of matter imagined in nanotechnology. However, this control is expressed in specific modes of control. Because, for Deleuze, control necessitates the minute control of flux and variation, it is itself perpetually changing and never complete. For example, he states: 'Control is short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time continuous and unbounded.' 35 
Nanotechnology and the mastery of evolution
Flux and variation are also of concern to nanotechnologists. Much nanotechnology is defined by the attempt to limit and control the evolution of biological and chemical systems. For example, Drexler's vision of nanotechnology represents an inherently mechanical mode of mastering atomic-scale flux. He seeks to both control and harness the movement, variation and digression of matter at atomic and molecular scales. Drexler's vision is largely mechanistic, suggesting that nanotechnologies can be produced through the hylomorphic imposition of an external design on a material substrate, through the precise manipulation of matter 'atom-by-atom'. His basic premise, following Feynman, is that there is no physical impediment to conceiving manufacturing technologies on the atomic scale. He represents this vision as a miniaturization of existing mechanical techniques to the atomic scale. Indeed, this mechanical bias of his thesis has been the source of a number of significant criticisms, primarily that the precise mechanical precision required is simply impossible. 36 Despite the extensive criticism of Drexler, both his goal of a 'bottom-up molecular project' and the broad project of gaining 'control over the structure of matter' maintain an important rhetoric in the field. In the extensive criticism of Drexler by Richard Smalley, 37 and latterly Richard Jones, 38 this notion of control is actually intensified. What is at issue for Smalley is whether the precise control of atomic structures, necessitated by Drexler's vision of nano-scale manufacture, is technically possible.
Due in part to the repudiation of the vision of 'molecular manufacture', Drexler's radically mechanistic version of nanotechnology has been substituted by a more conservative and pragmatic set of nanoscale possibilities. 39 At issue is the sheer physical possibility of autonomous nanoscale machines and the precision necessary to 'create' them. Recent scholarship has, however, revived the radical possibility of nanoscale machinic autonomy by rethinking the very way in which such machines might be created. In this biomimetic model, such machines are grown using existing biological systems as working examples. In the words of Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, there are 'two cultures of nanotechnology'. 40 Both present different understandings of the relationship between design and matter. One version of nanotechnology is implicitly mechanical. The material world is completely atomized as simply an aggregate of particles. It is in this sense that it is suggested that it will be possible to create anything 'from the bottom-up', simply by arranging atoms and molecules in certain (desired) ways. Alternatively, Richard Jones imagines a different form of nano-scale control in which technical interventions harness rather than master the chaotic interactions at the nanoscale. He re-presents these same goals, but changes the route through which they will be achieved. He suggests that nano-scale machines will be achieved through a more bio-mimetic, or emulatory, nanotechnology which both takes its inspiration from, and actively utilizes, existing biological systems. 41 Rather than imagine nanotechnology as a set of mechanical interventions at the nanoscale, Jones presents a vision of nanotechnology that is modelled on naturally occurring biological systems. For Jones, naturally occurring 'molecular assemblages' such as protein and DNA represent a functional equivalent of self-assembling and self-organizing molecular machines. Jones' thesis is that biological systems present functioning models through which more purposeful nanotechnological interventions may be made. For Jones, bionanotechnology is a route through which applications at the nanoscale may be achieved. He states his basic vision as follows:
My own view is that radical nanotechnology will be developed, but not necessarily along the path proposed by Drexler. I accept the force of the argument that biology gives us proof in principle that a radical nanotechnology, in which machines of molecular scale manipulate matter and energy with great precision, can exist. But this argument also shows that there may be more than one way of reaching the goal of radical nanotechnology, and that the path proposed by Drexler may not be the best one to follow. 42 Significantly for Jones, this necessitates a design process that is both open to, and able to harness, molecular evolution: 'Evolution needs some kind of selection pressure -some kind of way of deciding which of the many random changes in the molecular sequence should survive and prosper.' 43 Jones maintains that nanoscale machines are both technically possible and a desirable route through which wide technical advances may be made, but suggests that the current 'engineering approach' may well prove unrealistic. Instead he adopts a bio-mimetic approach, suggesting that the creation of molecular machines, necessary to fulfil the radical vision of 'bottom up' manufacture, may be created by copying nature -that is emulating existing self-replicating systems such as protein and DNA. Similarly, Seeman and Belcher outline this aim of 'emulating biology' by re-creating self-assembling systems:
A key property of biological nanostructures is molecular recognition, leading to self-assembly and the templating of atomic and molecular structures. For example, it is well known that two complementary strands of DNA will pair to form a double helix. DNA illustrates two features of self-assembly. The molecules have a strong affinity for each other and they form a predictable structure when they associate. Those who wish to create defined nanostructures would like to develop systems that emulate this behaviour. Thus, rather than milling down from the macroscopic level, using tools of greater and greater precision (and probably cost), they would like to build nanoconstructs from the bottom up, starting with chemical systems. 44 Although there is a strong deterministic logic central to the representation of nanotechnology, 45 this sense of momentary control describes the practice of actually building nanostructures. For example, Karen J. Elder discusses polymerization as a way in which nano-scale structures may be constructed. 46 This is a curious model of a kind of construction where a nano-scale architecture is grown rather than accomplished. The resulting form, though desired, is perhaps temporary. Indeed, the object of such research is to control the growth in such a manner that it evolves in desired ways. Similarly, take Seeman and Belcher's description of the use of biological systems in building complex and functional systems:
In natural systems, macromolecules exert exceptional control over inorganic nucleation, phase stabilisation assembly, and pattern formation. Biological systems assemble nanoscale building blocks into complex and functionally sophisticated structures with high perfection, controlled size, and compositional uniformity. (. . .) The exquisite selectivity of complementary biological molecules offers a possible avenue to control the formation of complex structures based on inorganic building blocks such as metal or semiconductor nanoparticles. 47 This notion of construction entails capitalizing on the interactions of biological systems -in this case rDNA, DNA and protein -in order to create desired patterns and objects. The object here is also control, but a control that is both provisional and active. Both of these design paradigms, though designed to achieve control, are in fact more like specific modes of control. In each, desired constructions -shapes, geometries and architectures -are the product of specific and perpetual control. Indeed, what is entailed is the control of interactions and processes in which we always sense, as Deleuze suggests, the possibility of escape. Both Drexler's mechanistic vision of nanotechnology and the more biologically nuanced vision of the bio-mimeticists create different relations with evolution. Both are ways of 'relating to' the flux caused by the internal evolution and variation of objects at the molecular scale and technical design paradigms in this context. Both cultures are ways of harnessing and (more significantly) limiting the creative force of evolution. Instead of imagining the possibility of simply arranging atoms mechanically, biomimetic nanotechnology aims to capitalize on the functionality of existing biological systems, particularly protein and DNA.
However, the distinction between these two versions of nanotechnology is never strictly defined as, in a sense, both are concerned with designing nano-scale mechanisms and controlling their operation. For mechanistic nanotechnology it is necessary to control the 'wild' Brownian interactions of atoms and molecules in order to create stable and functional objects. Similarly, bio-mimetic nanotechnology requires the precise control of biological systems in order to achieve desired and designed outcomes. Despite the hubris of complete design in nanotechnology, these kinds of nano-scale interventions have produced only temporary states of order. 48 Whereas in mechanistic versions of nanotechnology it is imagined that the complex relations of atomic and molecular particles -the internal movement of matter that is the equivalent of Deleuze's machinic phylum -will be overcome by the disciplines of design and engineering, in biomimetic nanotechnology it is suggested that technical objects will be created by utilizing this very complexity. In particular it is suggested that nanotechnologies will be created by piggybacking on existing self-replicating systems such as protein, DNA or rDNA.
At issue then is not simply a Deleuzian openness, or affirmation, of flux, variation and evolution. Indeed, whereas Deleuze appropriates Simondon's understanding of the spontaneous individuation of technology -producing a dynamic theory of technology 49 -both 'cultures' of nanotechnology seek to limit this anarchic potential for evolution 'all the way down'. Indeed, though biomimetic nanotechnology seeks to utilize existing biological machines, and artificially evolve new forms of such machinery, the real work of such a design paradigm is ensuring the stability of the resulting structures and systems. Take for example, Michael Conrad's model of 'emergent computation through self-assembly'. 50 He presents a framework in which the 'self-organising capacities of biological systems are extended expressions of nonlinearity inherent in the time evolution of the universe'. 51 Biological systems are the emergent, and hence spontaneous, effects of non-linear processes. Conrad suggest that such machines are internally fluctuating, challenging the ways that such systems may be designed or harnessed technically. He states:
If a collection of components is allowed to self-organise in the first place (. . .) then self-consistency is automatically ensured. In general such self-organised aggregates do not perform functions desired by the investigator observing their formation, unlike the totally macroscopic machines that are pasted together in a planned way by a designer with a definite conception in mind. However, the adaptivity of self-organising systems allows for moulding of the function in a step by step trial and error fashion, just as biological organisations adapt through step by step variation and selection. (. . .) Simple reverse engineering of existing biological organisations cannot work, according to the fluctuation model, since they ignore the hysteretic properties of the vacuum sea. 52 Conrad's model is of a moulding of the functions of biological systems, by trial and error. Conrad re-imagines the place of design -'reverse engineering cannot work' -insisting on a level of artisanal intimacy in the creation of human-directed biological machines. The incompleteness of the technical control over the atomic scale necessitates, for Conrad , a more open-ended conception of the technological possibilities at this scale.
Deleuze's evolutionary ethic
Such inventions are provisional stabilizations of processes of chemical synthesis and biological interaction. This is inconsistent with the vision of nanotechnology as being able to 'create anything from the bottom up'. Rather, such inventions necessitate a Deleuzian sense of the temporality of control and the individuation of technical systems. It is in this sense that Deleuze's understanding of the dynamism of control finds its material expression. Similarly, Oyama develops a notion of the 'emergence of control':
Control of development and behaviour may be said to emerge in at least three senses. First, it emerges in interaction, defined by the mutual selectivity of interactants. Second, it emerges through hierarchical levels, in the sense that entities or processes at one level interact to give rise to the entities or processes at the next, while upper-level processes can in turn be reflected in lower-level ones. Third, control emerges through time, sometimes being transferred from one process to another. 53 The crucial point for Oyama, and for Deleuze, is that control emerges. It emerges in interactions with the very processes that are (to be) controlled. This means both that control is partial and that design itself emerges with the object. The word emergence here is crucial. In Seeman and Belcher's constructions of nano-geometries using DNA, we might speak of the emergent self-organization of such structures. The design, control and precision necessary to generate such nanoscale geometries emerges with the structures themselves and the processes through which they are formed.
The importance, for Deleuze, of the emergence of control is that it signals the ontological incompleteness of design and the spontaneous variation of technology. This, for Deleuze, is both ontological and ethical and defines his own particular stance in relation to evolution and variation. Deleuze draws strongly on Bergson's notion of variation in developing this ethic. He finds in Bergson the idea of the constant repetition of the object (its simulacrum) that suggests that the object is opened up, repotentialized, returned as constantly differentiated, and constantly multiple. In Deleuzian terms, repetition introduces a form of differentiation that replaces the term IS in the being of the object (X = X = NOT Y) with AND (. . . X AND Y AND Z AND. . .): 'Substitute the AND for IS. A and B. (. . .) The multiple is no longer an adjective which is subordinate to the One which divides or the Being which encompasses it. It is a noun, a multiplicity which constantly inhabits each thing.' 54 Bergson offers a complex and simultaneous analysis of both the 'thing-in-itself' and the thing as an 'aggregate of images'. Deleuze sees in Bergson a fundamental critique of the notion of categorical difference:
If philosophy is to have a positive and direct relation with things, it is only to the extent that it claims to grasp the thing in itself in what it is, in its difference from all that it is not, which is to say in its internal difference. 55 Bergson's concept of variance becomes crucial. It is a fundamental critique of the notion of categorical difference. Rather than posit a fundamental or essential difference between objects, Bergson allows difference itself to be something. Objects differ from themselvesinternally. This is not to obliterate distinction but to fundamentally reconceive the notion of natural difference. Differentiation acts, according to both Bergson and Deleuze, not between objects, but within objects. For both Bergson and Deleuze matter is anything but a boundary. Rather matter is internally unstable.
This material waywardness is not simply metaphorical, or a kind of characterization of matter. Rather it is a waywardness that is based in Deleuze's molecular ontology, and the internal flux of matter at that scale. It is also inherently personal and ethical, defined by an openness to change and variation, all the way down to the molecular level. Take, for example, Deleuze and Guattari's description 'becoming-dog':
Do not imitate a dog, but make your organism enter into composition with something else in such a way that the particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed will be canine as a function of the relation of movement and rest, or of molecular proximity, into which they enter. Clearly, this something else can be quite varied, and be more or less directly related to the animal in question. 56 Becoming, in this sense (though often misrepresented) is a fundamentally materialist ethic, open to internal variation. In Deleuze's ontology this 'something else' is always difference itself: the action of variation and flux, in an ethic that enters into a relation with difference itself. It is a kind of atomic flux between the object/subject (of course these terms no longer mean much) and the other. It is precisely these same internal variations that are the subject of both design and construction in nanotechnology. Deleuze suggests that, because of such self-differentiating movement and variation, design and construction are more complex than admitted in the hubristic accounts of nanotechnology. For Deleuze design is not imposed from without, but emerges from within matter. The fundamental departure for Deleuze on the basis of such an ontology, is to conceive of modes of relating to the evolution of technology. For Deleuze and Guattari this ethic -or even politics -'is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival'. 57 Such an ethics adopts an 'artisanal' stance similar to that of Conrad's design by trial and error. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is a question of 'arraying oneself in an open space' in the same way that Conrad imagines a trial-and-error design process. Finally then, this Deleuzian stance, or attitude, is open to the paradox of the individuating endurance of both science and technology, and to possibilities for spontaneous eruption in these temporal arrangements.
